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During the past two decades many low income countries (LICs) 
have experienced rapid expansion in the volume of agricultural 
loans as well as in the number of rural offices of financial 
intermediaries. In some countries, such as Brazil and Thailand, 
loans have been the main tool used to stimulate agricultural 
development. In other countries, such as India and the Philip-
pines, the building of rural bank branches has been an important 
part of rural development. While agricultural loans have been 
emphasized, relatively little attention has been given to 
mobilizing voluntary financial savings. In many countries, most 
funds lent for agricultural purposes are provided by governments, 
urban based banks, or foreign donor agencies. 
Governments have used credit programs to boost agricultural 
output by encouraging farmers to use modern inputs, to make more 
on-farm investments, and to compensate farmers through inexpens-
ive loans for other government policies that discourage produc-
tion. They have also been used to help the rural poor by setting 
lower interest rates on small than on large loans. As is the 
case with most development efforts, these programs include 
successes and failures. Some credit efforts, for example, have 
encountered serious loan recovery problems, and many countries 
have also found it easier to expand the volume of short-term 
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credit than it was to supply medium- and long-term rural loans. 
In a few instances loan recovery problems, combined with rela-
tively large loan transaction costs, have undermined the finan-
cial integrity of the intermediary and caused lender collapse. 
Over the past decade there has been a large increase in the 
number of studies, evaluations, and publications focusing on 
rural finance. Since much of this literature is summarized in 
Donald (1976), the Von Pischke and others book (1983), and the 
Adams and others book (1984), we cite extensively from these 
three sources. (References that follow in the text will give the 
number and Roman numerals of publications cited in the list of 
publications at the end of the paper, and page numbers where 
appropriate.) our presentation is divided into eight parts. The 
next section provides a brief discussion of the contribution that 
rural financial markets (RFMs) make to development. This is 
followed by additional sections that cover important controver-
sies in, and lessons that can be drawn from, the recent experi-
ence with RFMs in LICs. 
Finance and Rural Development 
Most financial markets conform to the contours of the 
societies they serve; where economic management is centralized, 
lending decisions tend to be rigid, concentrated, and programmed; 
while in societies where production decisions are disbursed, 
financial markets must be flexible. In most cases financial 
markets play a more dynamic role in decentralized than in 
centrally planned economies. 
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Typically, intermediaries in RFMs are diverse across 
countties (III, 77-96), but there is more uniformity in agri-
cultural credit policy objectives, rural financial policies, and 
in problems encountered (I, 36-58). It is common for RFMs to 
suffer more severe problems than are found in other segments of a 
country's financial system. This is because the most difficult 
thing a financial market can be asked to do is to serve clients 
who are widely disbursed, those who require large numbers of 
small transactions, and those who operate in an industry that 
experiences unanticipated shocks in prices, incomes, and yields. 
Also, because adversities in rural areas often affect a large 
number of rural households at the same time, it is difficult for 
lenders to diversify assets and liabilities to cushion such 
shocks. Government policies that repress agricultural incomes 
add to RFM problems. 
Discussions about RFMs are often confusing because the 
fungibility of financial instruments is poorly understood. 
Fungibility, or interchangeability, means that one unit of money, 
be it owned or borrowed, is just like any other unit of money 
(V, 74-83). This feature of financial instruments makes it dif-
ficult--some say impossible--to control the use of the addi-
tional liquidity provided by a loan. In agricultural lending 
there is no necessary relationship between the justification 
given on the loan application for borrowing and the marginal 
change in liquidity use by the borrower. Rural households and 
firms typically have multiple sources and uses of liquidity. 
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Fungibility is involved when a borrower substitutes borrowed 
funds for owned funds, that they planned to commit to the 
particular activity with or without a loan. In some cases the 
borrower may decide to divert all of the funds borrowed to some 
unauthorized purpose. With either substitution or diversion, 
borrowers do less of the activity specified in the loan document 
than planners or the financial intermediary intended. Even when 
loans are given in kind, the borrower has the option of reselling 
the borrowed goods and to use the funds received from the sale 
for any purpose. 
Because large numbers of borrowers and lenders are involved 
in rural financial intermediation, it is virtually impossible for 
policymakers to allocate loans effectively through a decentral-
ized financial system in accord with a credit allocation plan (I, 
449-458). Policymakers may program cheap loans for a crop such 
as rice, for example, and try to force financial intermediaries 
to extend loans for that purpose. The intent may be to compen-
sate rice farmers for low rice prices through cheap credit. The 
fact that rice prices are low, however, causes the expected 
returns from investments in rice-growing activities also to be 
low. Under these circumstances rice farmers will divert the 
additional liquidity provided by loans to activities other than 
rice production, that provide higher returns at the margin or 
more satisfaction. Because of fungibility and the large number 
of particpants involved in RFMs, the ability of the credit 
planner to target loans in a decentralized economy is largely 
illusory. 
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In recent attention given to RFMs seven major controversies 
stand out. These are (1) What institutional form is best? 
(2) How does the economic vitality of agriculture affect RFMs? 
(3) Which policies are most effective in influencing lender be-
havior? (4) What is the appropriate interest rate policy in RFMs? 
(5) How important are borrowers' and lenders' loan transaction 
costs in RFMs? (6) What is the best way to improve loan re-
payment performance? And (7) do rural financial savings matter? 
Each of these topics will be discussed in the following sections, 
and lessons that have been learned will be drawn where appro-
priate. 
Institutional Form 
During the past 30 years numerous institutions have been 
created to provide rural financial services in Lies. The 
organizational form has depended on the dominant economic 
philosophy of the country, the nature of the rest of the formal 
financial system, and what international donors were interested 
in at the time. As a result, a large variety of rural financial 
intermediaries are found across LICs. Most of these institutions 
can be grouped into four categories: cooperatives, various types 
of government-owned agricultural development banks, rural private 
banks, and lending activities included in multipurpose develop-
ment agencies focusing on a region or commodity. Most countries 
have experimented with more than one institution and often 
sustain several types of rural lending agencies. 
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Initially, many new credit agencies were modeled after those 
in high income countries. Examples of this are the farmers 
associations in Taiwan and in south Korea that were patterned 
after the farmers associations in Japan, rural private banks in 
Vietnam and the Philippines based on similar banks in the u.s., 
and the credit unions in Africa and Latin America similar to 
credit unions in North America. 
Recently, there has been less emphasis placed on institu-
tional transfers and more emphasis placed on developing financial 
intermediaries unique to LICs or on strengthening existing 
financial intermediaries. Also ,there is now less emphasis 
placed on substituting formal for informal credit. Recent 
research from various countries has shown that monopoly profits 
are less in informal lending than had been widely assumed, and 
that informal lenders often provide some financial services more 
efficiently than is possible through formal credit programs (V, 
233-275). several countries, including Malaysia, have gone so far 
as to experiment with using marketing intermediaries as retail 
outlets for loans provided by government credit agencies (V, 
218-224). It is becoming more widely recognized that when formal 
loans are spent by borrowers, much of this additional liquidity 
moves into informal financial systems. As a result, an expansion 
in the formal credit system causes a growth in informal finance 
and also results in more competition and smaller monopoly profits 
among informal lenders. 
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Lessons Learned 
--... -- ----- ----
Cases can be found where most institutional forms for 
providing financial services in rural areas have had serious 
shortcomings or have failed. At the same time, cases can also be 
found where virtually every institutional form has been at least 
moderately successful. While certain institutions such as 
cooperatives work better in some societies than in others, it 
appears that all financial intermediaries will flounder if the 
sector it serves is heavily taxed and if repressive policies are 
used against financial intermediaries. As discussed later, 
institutions that mobilize savings as well as lend are more 
likely to be viable than intermediaries who only lend. Policies, 
not organizational form, appear to be the main determinant of 
institutional success or failure. 
Economic Returns in Agriculture 
The well-being of a financial markets largely depends on the 
economic vitality of the firms and households they serves (I, 
194-225). If farmers receive low prices for their products due to 
distorted exchange rates, food price controls, imports of cheap 
food, or inefficient markets, their ability to use financial 
markets will be diminished; they will be less willing to borrow, 
be less able to repay loans, and have less capacity to save. Low 
and unstable yields and lack of public investment in agriculture 
reinforce adverse effects of low farm prices. It is much 
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easier to develop a healthy RFM where returns to agricultural 
investments are high, and relatively stable, and rural incomes 
are increasing. 
It is common for countries to attempt to compensate farmers 
for these adverse effects of other economic policies by providing 
loans that carry concessionary terms. For example, the govern-
ment may feel that farmers are "taxed" through low product prices 
resulting from food price controls, and that this tax decreases 
farm production. The government may feel it is impossible to 
remove the tax and decide to use a second-best policy of giving 
farmers an offsetting "subsidy" through cheap credit (I, 73-75). 
They hope that the cheap credit will encourage the borrowers to 
increase production to levels expected without the tax, and that 
the low-interest-rate subsidy will offset farmers' losses in 
income due to the tax. 
The second-best argument has serious shortcomings when used 
to justify cheap credit as an equitable and efficient way to 
compensate farmers for the adverse effects of other policies. 
This is because the low interest rates on loans induce both 
borrower and lender to concentrate loans (I, 78-95). That is, 
lenders have powerful incentives to minimize their cost of 
lending by concentrating the cheap loans in the hands of 
relatively few borrowers: those who have borrowed from the lender 
previously, those with excellent loan collateral, and those who 
take large loans. At the same time, these influential borrowers 
have powerful incentives to capture as much of the cheap credit 
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as possible. These reinforcing special interests result in only 
a small number of the farmers getting most of the cheap credit 
and many of the farmers being unable to obtain any cheap loans. 
Because only those who receive cheap loans are subsidized, 
while all who produce the taxed product are disadvantaged, there 
is an inefficient match between incidence of the tax and subsidy. 
Those with no loans, or those getting only small amounts, receive 
little or no compensation through a credit subsidy. Clearly, 
those who do not receive a loan cannot be expected to increase 
the output of a product that has a depressed price resulting from 
government policy, because someone else gets a cheap loan. Even 
those producers who receive cheap loans are not induced to make 
investments that are not privately profitable. If it does not 
pay farmers, without loans, to invest in producing a low-return 
product such as rice (because of price ceilings) it is still not 
profitable for them to produce rice after getting cheap credit. 
Because of fungibility, the producer will divert the additional 
liquidity to other uses that provide higher private returns. 
Because cheap loans tend to be concentrated in relatively 
few hands, second-best policies also result in less equitable 
income distribution. Because the size of the interest rate 
subsidy is proportional to the size of the loans, large borrowers 
get large subsidies while borrowers of small amounts get small 
subsidies (I, 120-132). The majority of the farmers who are 
rationed out of the financial market are unable to obtain any of 
the cheap credit and realize no subsidy. Since credit access 
and size of loan are highly correlated with levels of income and 
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assets owned, the well-to-do benefit most from cheap credit. The 
second-best argument thus fails on both equity and efficiency 
grounds. 
Lessons Learned 
• It is unrealistic to expect RFMs to work well if the sector 
they serve is not economically healthy and growing. Likewise, it 
is not realistic to expect that cheap and abundant credit can 
offset low incomes or low returns to investment in agriculture. 
Cheap credit does not make an unprofitable investment profitable. 
Cheap credit that is largely captured by the well-to-do also 
worsens income distributions and the efficiency with which 
resources are used. 
Important Policies and Regulations 
Because of the diffuse nature of financial markets it has 
been common for governments to attempt to influence lender 
behavior through regulations. While some regulations are used by 
all governments to maintain orderly activities in financial 
markets, many policies are aimed at tilting the behavior or 
performance of the financial system toward a certain group or 
activity: small farmers, medium- and long-term loans, land 
reform participants, or producers in a specific geographic area. 
These attempts to target loans can be grouped into five major 
categories: those that specify loan portfolio requirements, those 
that use rediscount facilities, those that shift the risk of loan 
default to others through crop and loan insurance, limits on 
branch banking, and nationalization of banks. 
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A common way for governments to try to influence intermed-
iary behavior is through requirements placed on loan portfolios. 
This may include setting of floors or ceilings on certain types 
of lending and limitations on loan size. For example, in the 
Philippines and Colombia banks are required to lend at least a 
certain percent of their total loans for agricultural purposes. 
In the Dominican Republic the government has set maximum sizes on 
loans that can be made by the government-owned agricultural bank, 
and in the Philippines the government has required banks to lend 
a certain percentage of its loans to small farmers or to rice 
producers. The main problem with loan portfolio restrictions is 
that it is relatively easy for the lender to conform to the 
restriction, yet evade its intent. The lender may make 
multiple small- to medium-sized loans to one individual to evade 
a loan-size ceiling, for example. or a lender can redefine the 
purpose of a loan: e.g., from that of purchasing a truck to that 
of an agricultural transportation loan. 
Rediscount Facilities 
Another popular policy tool has been rediscount facilities. 
These are windows in the central bank that allow ultimate lenders 
to discount targeted loans with the central bank and receive 
additional loanable funds at concessionary interest rates. Most 
of the LICs that have large and relatively well-developed 
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financial markets make extensive use of these rediscount facili-
ties. Governments and donor agencies have been particularly 
aggressive in promoting these facilities as ways of moving 
outside funds into RFMs. Typically, the ultimate lenders are 
allowed a spread between the concessionary rate paid to the 
central bank for the funds and the rate they are allowed to 
charge the ultimate borrower. Wide spreads are thought to be an 
effective way of inducing the lender to stress targeted loans. 
There are two weaknesses in these rediscount facilities. 
First, the concessionary interest rates set on rediscount funds 
are often lower than the rates that intermediaries must pay to 
mobilize voluntary private savings. This provides powerful 
incentives for the intermediaries to ignore or even discourage 
private deposits. The second limitation is that concessionary 
discount facilities have a weak effect on how lenders make loan 
decisions. As is true with the ultimate borrower, intermediaries 
take advantage of the fungibility of funds when it is in their 
economic interests to do so. Take, for example, a case where a 
government has imposed a low ceiling on the price that farmers 
receive for their crop. Yet, the government may feel it is 
necessary to promote the production of that crop to maintain or 
expand exports. As a result, the government may open a redis-
count window in the central bank to provide cheap loans for that 
crop. There are strong reasons, however, for the ultimate lender 
to be very hesitant to expand lending for the crop in question: 
because expected farm returns for that crop are low. Lenders will 
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likely transfer their current loans that meet the target require-
ments to the rediscount line, and thus expand the volume of total 
funds available for other lending. 
LOaQ_an~ crop guarantees 
several countries have made extensive use of guarantees or 
insurance to lessen the lenders' risks due to loan default (e.g., 
Mexico and Costa Rica). In some cases this might be a loan 
guarantee administered by a government agency that insures the 
bank will be reimbursed a certain percentage of qualifying loan 
defaults. These percentages typically range from 20 to 50 
percent. In other cases the guarantee may be in the form of crop 
insurance that is often payable to the intermediary (e.g.,Philip-
pines, Sri Lanka, and India). Here the crop insurer agrees to 
pay the lender a certain percentage of the loan made to the 
farmer for the crop after allowable crop damage has been veri-
fied. The main objective of these guarantees is to induce 
lenders to extend more loans to a certain target group by 
transferring part of the loan recovery risk to other agencies. 
There are two main problems in these loan and crop guarantee 
programs. First, they are often expensive. The government may 
be forced to provide large subsidies to pay for the costs of 
insured default not covered by premium payments. The government 
is also often required to subsidize substantial administrative 
costs. This is particularly important in crop insurance program 
in the tropics. Because crop damage in these areas often affects 
a large number of producers at the same time, a large insurer 
staff is required to make timely assessments of crop damage. 
- 14 -
Rural Bank Branches 
A few countries have been very aggressive in promoting new 
rural banks or rural branches of existing banks. In India and 
Bangladesh commercial banks are forced to open a certain number 
of rural branches before they can receive permission to open 
additional, more profitable urban branches. Also, in Vietnam, 
the Philippines, and in Ghana donor or government funds have 
been used to induce the formation of private rural banks. The 
government or donor funds may be given or lent to the new bank on 
concessionary terms. In many cases these funds provide part 
of the equity needed by the new bank owners to establish a rural 
bank. 
Banks may respond to government pressure and open token 
branch offices in rural areas. This may include offices that are 
only open a few days a week or that only offer a very limited 
range of financial services. In extreme cases, the new rural 
branch may mainly mobilize rural savings for use in urban areas. 
Bank nationalization 
A number of countries have nationalized part or all of their 
commercial banks. In some cases this occurs as a country changes 
from a colony to an independent nation. In other cases the 
government nationalizes banks in an attempt to have greater 
control over their activities. Costa Rica, for example, na-
tionalized most of its banks over 40 years ago, while Mexico has 
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done so within the past several years. India, Pakistan, and 
Bangladesh also have banking systems that are largely nation-
alized. 
The nationalized banks in the subcontinent have been 
particularly effective in expanding rural financial offices. It 
is less clear, however, if nationalized banks are more effective 
than other types of financial intermediaries in increasing the 
financial services available to the rural poor, in increasing the 
amounts of medium-and long-term loans that are available to 
farmers, in providing extensive and attractive financial savings 
services, in setting up a financial system that lowers the 
transaction costs associated with financial intermediation, and 
in creating rural financial institutions that are innovative and 
self sustaining. Recent research in Costa Rica, for example, has 
shown that the government-owned financial system there is having 
difficulty in reaching a large number of the rural poor with 
loans. Its performance in this regard is not much better than 
the performance in other countries that do not have nationalized 
banks. 
Lessons Learned 
The results from various policy measures aimed at altering 
lender behavior in favor of a target group or commodity have been 
mixed. In a few cases the results have been quite different from 
those intended, and in other cases there have been undesirable 
side effects. In many cases the net result of these policies has 
been to orient the financial intermediaries away from mobilizing 
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private savings in rural areas, and toward getting loanable funds 
from governments and donors (I, 298-307). Also, because rural 
financial intermediaries are widely disbursed, it has been 
relatively easy for them to evade the intent of regulations if it 
was not in their best interests to conform. It is also common 
for these regulations to force financial intermediaries to 
increase their transaction costs as they attempt to conform to or 
evade the intent of regulations. 
Transaction Costs 
The amounts of resources used for transactions by RFM 
participants are important measures of performance. Like a 
well-oiled and efficient machine, financial markets that perform 
with little friction create few transaction costs for partici-
pants. Where financial markets are not working efficiently 
these transaction costs can be quite large for both lender and 
borrower. Transaction costs for the lender include the expenses 
of mobilizing funds for on-lending, costs of collecting infor-
mation about potential borrowers, and cost of extending, main-
taining and collecting loans (I, 104-119). A significant part of 
these costs may result from loan targeting requirements placed on 
the lender by policymakers (I, 96-103). It is often overlooked 
that borrowers and savers also incur transaction costs in 
financial markets. For small and new borrower-savers, these 
costs can be a relatively large part of the costs of making 
financial transactions. These costs include the time taken by 
the borrower-saver to make deposits or negotiate loans, transport 
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costs to visit the intermediary, paperwork costs, possible bribes 
to get the loan, and the costs of providing loan collateral in a 
form acceptable to the lender. For new and small borrowers these 
loan transaction costs can be a major part of the value of their 
loans, and can be several times the interest paid on loans. 
Recent research by Ladman has shown that the costs of 
financial intermediation are not shared by borrowers-savers and 
intermediaries in fixed proportions (I, 104-119). Under some 
circumstances the lenders may find it in their interest to 
absorb, for preferred clients, some of the loan or deposit 
transaction costs normally incurred by borrower-savers. At the 
same time, a lender may force non-preferred clients to incur 
transaction costs normally absorbed by the intermediary as a way 
of discouraging them from asking for a loan. 
When financial markets are repressed through interest rate 
ceilings, intermediaries are limited in their ability to dis-
criminate among clients on the basis of interest rates; they 
often use increased collateral requirements and reallocation of 
transaction costs as substitute rationing mechanisms. The 
shifting of transaction costs can be an important part of loan 
rationing and a way for intermediaries to discourage or encourage 
people seeking loans. 
Several examples can illustrate how transfer of these 
transaction costs affect credit rationing. When intermediaries 
are eager to obtain certain borrower-saver business, they might 
reduce the transaction cost for the preferred clients by sending 
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mobile banks to villages to do financial transactions (Philip-
pines, Pakistan). They may also allow preferred borrowers to 
negotiate new loans by phone or by visiting a bank's office only 
once. At the same time, non-preferred clients may be forced to 
visit the intermediary numerous times to negotiate, obtain, and 
repay the loan (Sudan, Brazil), forced to wait in long lines in 
the sun during each visit, fill out numerous forms to obtain the 
loan (Haiti, Tunesia, Portugal), and also give gifts to the loan 
officer in order to receive rapid and favorable attention. 
Lessons Learned 
The amount and the way transaction costs are shared tell a 
great deal about how well financial markets are performing. They 
also reveal how intermediaries react to regulations. If finan-
cial markets are working efficiently, the total costs of finan-
cial intermediation per unit of money handled should decline over 
time for both the intermediary and the borrower-saver. These 
reductions should result from innovations. In most countries 
those who work in financial markets are creative, but when 
markets are heavily regulated and repressed, a large 
part of this creative energy is directed at innovations that 
dilute the effect of regulations on the financial intermediary. 
These innovations often increase, rather than decrease, the 
total costs of financial intermediation. 
When loans are targeted, the government or donor agency 
often requires the intermediary to adopt new procedures to reach 
those targeted and also provide the funding source with periodic 
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reports on the extent to which program objectives are met. 
Often, the effect of this targeting is to increase sharply the 
lender's cost (I, 96-103). In some cases these additional 
transaction costs have been so large that they undermined the 
economic base of the intermediary. Also, in some cases these 
programs impose additional loan transaction costs on the borrower 
because of farm plans and collection of information needed to 
prepare reports for funding agencies. Extensive loan targeting 
appears to increase significantly the amount of friction in 
financial markets and also to reduce the overall efficiency. 
Loan Repayment Performance 
High rates of loan delinquency and default have plagued 
agricultural credit programs in LICs, especially in agricultural 
development banks (III, 137-153). It is not uncommon to find 
more than 30 percent of loans outstanding have payments overdue, 
and this is often a substantial underestimate of the number of 
problem loans because of loan refinancing. Accounting practices 
used in many LICs also diguise the extent of loan problems. A 
careful analysis of loan delinquency often reveals that the 
problem is even more serious than appeared at first sight. 
There is substantial literature on loan delinquency in LICs, 
especially pertaining to agricultural credit and public-sector 
development banks. The traditional view expressed in this 
literature is that borrowers become delinquent for either of two 
basic reasons: they are unable to repay, or they are unwilling to 
repay (V, 183-189). The inability to repay may result from 
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inadequate incomes which, in turn, are explained by fortuitous 
events such as bad weather, pests or sudden price declines, or by 
structural deficiencies such as inadequate markets, infrastruc-
ture or technology. The main reasons given for the unwillingness 
to repay are that loans are viewed as welfare grants or political 
patronage or simply that borrowers plan from the beginning not to 
repay and therefore divert loans to consumption expenditures. 
Most research on loan delinquency in LICs is based on asking 
delinquent borrowers why they failed to repay on time. Not 
surprisingly, most delinquent borrowers report that they were 
unable to repay for one or more of the reasons suggested above, 
and not that they were unwilling to repay. This often leads to 
the conclusion that little can be done about loan delinquency 
short of basic structural reforms in agriculture. Agricultural 
development banks, especially those that are supposed to focus 
their lending on small farmers, are thereby given an excuse for 
tolerating high rates of loan delinquency. 
In more recent work on loan delinquency in Lies (IV, 58-67), 
it has been shown that delinquency rates are not always high on 
agricultural loans, even when the lenders are state-owned banks 
with development objectives. In fact, in the case of Costa Rica, 
delinquency rates were found to be lower on agricultural than on 
non-agricultural loans and lowest on loans to small farmers. 
This performance is explained, in part, by the efficient tech-
niques that the banks have developed to gather information about 
potential rural borrowers and also by incentives for bank employ-
ees to achieve low delinquency rates and for borrowers to repay 
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repay promptly in order to maintain access to cheap credit. 
Other authors hdve pointed out that patronage and politics are 
often paramount in the operation of state-owned development 
banks, so that bank employees may have few incentives to imple-
ment the policies that are often recommended to reduce high rates 
of loan delinquency (V, 175-182 and 337-345: I, 36-48 and 
183-193). 
This increasing awareness of the importance of incentives 
for both lenders and borrowers in determining loan delinquency 
can be termed the new view of delinquency, in contrast to the 
traditional view where borrowers are seen as either unable or 
unwilling to repay. A more appropriate point of departure 
suggested by the new view is the costs and benefits to a borrower 
of repaying or not repaying a loan. A model along such lines has 
been developed in which a utility maximizing borrower is seen as 
choosing to play either of two lotteries, where one is to repay 
and the ather is to became delinquent (II). The main advantage 
of playing the repayment lottery is the probability of receiving 
a new larger loan in the future on which a positive rate of 
return can be expected. Against this must be weighed the 
explicit financial charges on the possible new loan, the trans-
actions costs involved in repaying and then negotiating and 
receiving a new loan, and the timeliness of the new loan. 
When a borrower chooses to play the delinquency lottery, two 
main outcomes are possible. The lender may do nothing, in which 
case the borrower keeps the current loan but is denied future 
loans from that lender, or the lender may take strong action so 
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that borrowers lose collateral pledged for the loan, in addition 
to which they may be denied future loans from other lenders. The 
possible loss from failing to receive a new loan may be larger 
than the most severe sanctions that a lender might impose on a 
delinquent borrower. 
Christen and Vogel have applied this model to a sample of 
over six thousand loans made by thirty credit unions in Honduras 
and have obtained results that support the usefulness of this new 
approach to explaining loan delinquency (II). The most important 
factors in determining whether a loan is likely to be repaid on 
time or to be delinquent were those related to the borrower's 
assessment of the probability of obtaining a new larger loan in 
the future on a timely basis. On the other hand, variables 
traditionally associated with the willingness or ability to 
repay, such as the stated use of the loan, were not helpful in 
explaining delinquency. 
Lessons Learned 
There may be some borrowers who fail to repay because they 
are absolutely unable to do so and there may be others who plan 
never to repay under any circumstances. However, the new view of 
loan delinquency suggests that it is more fruitful to analyze the 
incentives that borrowers have to repay on time or to become 
delinquent. Borrowers will find it attractive to repay on time 
and maintain a good credit rating if they view the lender as able 
to provide new larger loans in the future on a timely basis w1th 
minimum transactions costs. The new view supports improvement~; 
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in selection and collection policies, but goes on to ask what 
incentives bank employees must have to implement such policies, 
particularly in the case of agricultural development banks where 
pol1tics, patronage and the feast-or-famine cycle of project 
funding may be important. With respect to increased borrower 
supervision and more stringent guarantees, the new view asks to 
what extent such policies will simply add to the transactions 
costs of borrowers and hence make it less attractive for bor-
rowers to maintain a good credit rating with the lender by 
repaying on time. The new view is clearly skeptical about the 
extent to which loan delinquency is beyond the control of the 
lender and is hence skeptical about recommendations of generous 
refinancing of overdue loans. 
Appropriate Interest Rate Policies 
The traditional view of appropriate interest rate policies 
for the agricultural sectors of LICs is that they should be kept 
low to promote agricultural development and to assist the rural 
poor. However, it became clear by the early 1970s that agricul-
tural credit projects based on low interest rates were encoun-
tering 5erious difficulties in most LICs (III, 97-117). Some 
observers began to argue that these widespread difficulties were 
not due to a different set of specific problems in each country, 
but rather to the low interest rate policies themselves (V, 
365-372; I, 65-77). Low interest rate loans did not appear to 
increase agricultural output or encourage the adoption of new 
technologies, and they often failed to reach the rural poor. 
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Moreover, policies of low interest loans frequently undermined 
the financial viability of lenders and almost everywhere dis-
couraged the mobilization of voluntary domestic resources by the 
financial institutions involved. 
To analyze low interest rate policies, it is essential to 
define what is meant by low and to distinguish among different 
measures of interest rates. With the prevalence of inflation in 
LICs during the past decade, it has become common to distinguish 
between nominal and real rates of interest, where real rates are 
adjusted for the rate of inflation (e.g., I, 65-77 and 120-132). 
such an adjustment is necessary because loans are almost always 
made and repaid in nominal terms (i.e., in money), so that when 
inflation is significant the nominal rate of interest may seem 
high while the real rate is actually low or even negative. When 
the real rates are negative, (i.e., when the rate of inflation 
exceeds the nominal rate of interest) borrowers repay lenders 
less in terms of goods and services than what they initially 
received. 
It is also useful to distinguish between the stated rate of 
interest on a loan and the effective rate, where the effective 
rate takes into account all charges on a loan, including not only 
fees and commissions but also such conditions as whether interest 
is collected in advance and whether compensating balances are 
required. As pointed out earlier, when governments attempt to 
set interest rates on loans significantly below the equil1brium 
rates that would be determined in competitive markets, lenders 
often respond by imposing additional charges and conditions that 
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raise effective rates substantially above stated rates. Borrow~ 
ers will largely be willing to accept these addit~onal charges 
and conditions so long as effective interest rates remain at 
least slightly below what would be paid in competitive markets. 
Moreover, government regulators will find it difficult to keep up 
with the innovations of lenders who continue their efforts to 
raise effective interest rates above stated rates, in some cases 
only doing so by transferring transaction costs to borrowers (I, 
166-182). 
The foregoing discussion of real versus nominal interest 
rates and effective versus stated rates helps to clarify problems 
that arise whenever governments in Lies attempt to establish 
interest rates below the equilibrium rates. As discussed 
earlier, low-interest loans for agriculture help to concentrate 
income distributions, result in productive resource being 
allocated less efficiently, and also undermine the financial 
viability of lenders. Lenders must be able to charge adequate 
interest rates on loans to cover costs, and costs are likely to 
be particularly high when lenders are supposed to serve a large 
number of small borrowers in rural areas and sometimes to provide 
technical assistance and supervision as well as loans. Govern-
ments and international donor agencies have often attempted to 
overcome this cost problem through grants or low interest rate 
rediscount facilities at the central bank for lenders who serve 
the designated clientele. Unfortunately, these grants and 
rediscounts have almost always undermined the incentives and the 
abilities of lenders to mobilize resources in domestic financial 
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markets. This not only penalizes domestic savers, and espe-
cially the rural poor among among these, but also substantially 
reduces the likelihood that lenders can avoid serious problems of 
loan delinquency. 
Lessons Learned 
The new view of interest rate policies rejects the tradi-
tional approach of low-interest loans. These traditional 
policies have generally failed to achieve their primary object-
lVes of promoting agricultural production and assisting the rural 
poor and have instead often undermined the financial viability of 
the lenders involved. The traditional approach has often 
overlooked the distinction between real and nominal interest 
rates and has generally failed to recognize the importance of 
effective, as opposed to stated, interest rates as well as the 
relationship between interest rates and transactions costs. The 
main recommendation of the new view is that interest rates must 
be high enough so that depositors can be adequately compensated 
and so that lenders can cover their costs. 
savings Mobilization bX Agricultural Lenders 
Savings mobilization is the forgotten half of rural finance 
(I, 248-265). The role of financial intermediaries is not only 
to lend but also to provide deposit facilities for savers in 
order to have funds to lend. Nevertheless, almost all rural 
finance projects in Lies have stressed low interest loans for 
agriculture and have neglected savings mobilization in rural 
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areas. The bias toward lending is also reflected in the lit-
erature on rural finance (III, 159-177). The studies that do 
deal w1th sav1ngs generally ignore savings mobilization by 
financial intermediaries and focus instead on the determinants of 
the portion of income that is saved rather than consumed. 
The neglect of savings mobilization can perhaps be explained 
in part by the often-heard arguments that savings cannot or 
should not be mobilized in rural areas. It is said that most of 
the rural population has no margin for saving over consumption 
and, in any case, does not respond to incentives such as higher 
interest rates. It is also argued that if financial institutions 
were encouraged to mobilize savings aggressively, savings would 
simply be diverted from one institution to another or from rural 
to urban areas, and higher interest payments to depositors would 
drive the institutions toward bankruptcy or force them to lend 
outside of rural areas where higher returns can be obtained. A 
more basic explanation for the neglect of savings mobilization 
may be that it is inconsistent with the predominant policy of 
low interest rate lending. 
Three important arguments can be made that savings mobili-
zation should be given at least as much emphasis as rural 
lending. First, more equitable income distribution is an 
important objective of rural finance projects, and traditional 
projects based on low interest rate lending have tended to bias 
the distribution of income away from the rural poor for reasons 
discussed earlier. Policies to improve savings opportunities 
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can, on the other hand, effectively redistribute income toward 
the rural poor. An essential function of financial intermedi-
aries is the pooling of funds, that is, bringing together small 
amounts from many savers so that relatively large projects 
involving economies of scale can be undertaken. Hence, by their 
nature, financial intermediaries serve more savers than borrowers 
and have individual deposits that are smaller on average than 
loans. Policies that focus on improving services for savers are 
a way to help the rural poor. 
There is a myth, mentioned above, that most of the rural 
population has no savings. If this were true, the rural poor 
would have become extinct long ago with the onset of the first 
emergency, and small farmers would have starved while waiting for 
the next harvest if they failed to save something from the 
previous harvest. The rural poor, more than anyone else, must 
have a liquid reserve to meet emergencies. Even the moneylender 
will not lend to someone with no accumulated or potential 
surplus, and friends and relatives, as well as rotating savings 
and credit associations, usually require the ability to recipro-
cate (I, 232-247; v, 262-268). Bouman has emphasized the 
widespread importance of savings in informal financial arrange-
ments in LICs, and other authors have reported numerous instances 
of significant savings capacity amon9 the rural poor (e.g., 
V, 134-147). 
The most important service that financial institutions can 
provide for rural savers is the opportunity to hold liquid 
deposits paying interest rates that are at least positive in real 
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terms. Without this, the rural poor are forced to hold a variety 
of inflation hedges, many of which earn low or negative rates of 
return, and to pay an inflation tax on any cash that is held to 
meet current obligations. The rural non-poor, on the other hand, 
can often avoid these unfortunate alternative because they have 
access to a wider range or investment possibilities. 
There is another myth, also mentioned above, that most of 
the rural population does not respond to interest rate incent-
ives. This view is often based on the weak response to so-
called interest rate reforms in which interest rates are raised 
somewhat, but continue to be negative in real terms. In other 
cases, interest rates on deposits are raised significantly, but 
financial institutions are expected to continue to lend at low 
rates of interest. These institutions respond quite logically by 
discouraging deposits through the imposition of high transactions 
costs on depositors in the form of inconvenient locations and 
hours, slaw service, excessive paperwork, and high minimum 
balance requirements. Recent research has shown substantial 
responsiveness by savers to appropriate policies, including 
higher real rates of interest (V, 399-407). 
Improved resource allocation is the second major argument 
for emphasizing savings mobilization. savings mobilization by 
financial intermediaries draws resources away from unproductive 
investments, especially inflation hedges, as the opportunity is 
provided to make deposits that earn positive real rates of 
interest. These resources can be on-lent by financial intermed-
iaries for those activities that promise the highest rates of 
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return. Some arguments frequently heard against savings mobili-
zation can actually help to clarify the ways in which savings 
mobilization can improve resource allocation. It is often said 
that aggressive savings mobilization by one institution will only 
divert deposits from other institutions with no gain to society. 
However, this neglects the gain to savers, who would not have 
moved their deposits without being better off, and the fact that 
financial institutions earning the highest risk adjusted returns 
on the funds entrusted to them will be able to compete most 
effectively for savings. 
It is also argued that no additional savings will be 
generated because the rural population will not save more in 
response to higher interest rates. such arguments often confuse 
the flow of savings from income with the allocation of a stock of 
savings among competing assets, and also raise the question of 
whether savings allocated to inflation hedges, such as inven-
tories of commodities, should be counted as saving or consump-
tion. Regardless of whether more is saved out of income, which 
is an open question both theoretically and empirically, effective 
savings mobilization can deploy the stock of assets of the rural 
population in more productive ways. Arguments for savings 
mobilization are also supported by the assertion that higher 
interest rates for depositors will force financial institutions 
to lend outside of rural areas and away from priority activities 
in order to obtain higher returns. However, because credit is 
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fungible, these funds are already flowing toward higher returns, 
albeit at a higher cost to society from the circumvention of 
credit controls. 
The beneficial effect of savings mobilization on the 
viability of financial institutions is the third major argument 
for greater emphasis on savings mobilization. Financial insti-
tutions that neglect savings mobilization are incomplete institu-
tions (I, 36-48). They not only fail to provide adequate 
services for rural savers, but they also make themselves less 
viable, as can be seen most clearly in the high rates of loan 
delinquency. When financial institutions deal with clients only 
as borrowers they forego useful information about the savings 
behavior of these clients that could allow them to improve 
estimates of creditworthiness. Furthermore, borrowers are more 
likely to repay promptly and lenders to take greater responsi-
bility for loan recovery when they know that funds come from 
neighbors, rather than from a government or donor. 
Financial institutions that mobilize savings effectively are 
likely to have a continual flow of funds available for lending, 
while those that neglect savings mobilization are inevitably 
subject to the feast-or-famine cycle of government and donor 
projects. Financial institutions are likely to have little 
interest in savings mobilization or loan recovery when cheap 
funds are available through government loans, central bank 
rediscounts or loans from international donors. It is generally 
ignored that the volume of resources that can be obtained through 
effective programs of savings mobilization and loan recovery is 
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potentially far greater than the most optimistic estimates of the 
amount of subsidized loans and grants available from governments 
and donors. 
There is not only mounting evidence that substantial amounts 
of savings can be mobilized in the rural areas of LICs, but also 
increasing knowledge about the techniques, including especially 
positive real rates of interest for depositors, that are particu-
larly effective in mobilizing these savings (V, 399-420). Vogel 
describes in detail a successful savings mobilization project 
that was recently carried out in rural Peru by a cooperative 
bank. The key factors in this success, which far surpassed the 
goals of the project, were high interest rates on deposits and 
good service for depositors in terms of convenient locations and 
hours of operations, a minimum of paperwork and other formalities 
and rapid attention to clients by the employees of the bank. 
savings campaigns which included publicity, prizes and lotteries 
also proved to be effective, and a particularly significant 
aspect of these campaigns was incentive payments for bank 
employees, so that more deposits did not simply mean more work. 
Lessons Learned 
Research in rural areas of LICs indicate that savers place 
considerable importance on access to future loans in selecting a 
financial institution. Also, research in various LICs indicates 
that innovative institutions have often been quite successful in 
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mobilizing savings (V, 289-307). At the same time, many formal 
financial intermediaries have been used by governments or 
international donors for purposes such as low interest lending 
that are inconsistent with aggressive savings mobilization, and 
in these cases savings mobilization has been neglected and the 
institutions have performed poorly (V, 340-362). savings 
mobilization, which can assist the rural poor and improve 
resource allocation as well as make financial institutions more 
viable, appears often to have been forgotten because of powerful 
incentives to neglect savings mobilization. 
Looking ahead 
continued population growth, shortfalls in agricultural 
production, and widespread rural poverty will force policy makers 
to continue to promote agricultural development in most LICs. If 
the past is any guide to the future, agricultural credit will 
continue to be a major part of the efforts aimed at resolving 
these problems. 
It is likely, however, that the problems and controversies 
that exist in RFMs in LICs will persist. The tendencies of 
governments to use policies that turn the terms-of-trade against 
agriculture and their use of a heavy hand in repressing financial 
markets will not provide healthy environments for the growth of 
RFMs in the future, any more so than they have in the past. The 
subtle and complex nature of financial markets make it all too 
easy for harried policy makers to assume success in agricultural 
credit projects when more careful analysis shows substantial 
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shortcomings. Few countries take the time and effort to do a 
careful diagnosis of the performance of their RFMs. This lack of 
analysis allows policy makers to sustain fanciful thinking rather 
than face reality. 
The main lesson to be learned from a review of recent 
research an evaluation of RFMs in LICs is that these markets 
could play a more efficient and equitable role in development if 
appropriate policies were adopted. These policies include much 
more emphasis on mobilization of voluntary private savings in 
rural areas, interest rate policies that sustain positive real 
rates of interest most of the time, less attention to eliminating 
the informal lender, and more stress on improving the overall 
quality of financial services provided by these markets. 
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